"We're coming up on Year 15 — can we get out through a qualified contract, and what actually changes about DCA's oversight once we're into the extended-use tail?"
The compliance/extended-use math: 30 years confirmed, not assumed
The QAP's own Definitions section frames the two periods precisely: the "Compliance Period" is "the initial fifteen year period during which a project must operate in accordance with the federal requirements," commencing with the first taxable year of the Federal Credit period, and the "Extended Use Period" is "the period beginning on the first day in the Compliance Period and ending on the later of the date specified by such agency in such agreement, or the date which is fifteen years after the close of the Compliance Period" (Core Plan §II) — a direct restatement of IRC §42(h)(6)(D)'s statutory floor, not an enhancement of it. DCA's compliance manual works the math with a concrete example: for a building whose first credit year is 2023, the credit period ends in 2032, the compliance period ends in 2037, and the extended use period ends, at minimum, in 2052 — 2023 plus 29 additional years, for a 30-year minimum total.
The manual is equally direct about the floor being a floor: "The 30-year period is a minimum. Certain properties may have an extended use period of more than 30 years. This extension will be reflected in the LURC/LURA." That is a case-by-case, deal-specific possibility documented in the recorded Declaration — not a QAP-wide rule that pushes every Georgia award past 30 years, and not evidence that Georgia's baseline commitment runs longer than the federal floor.
Every 2026-2027 award waives the Qualified Contract right — but DCA's fee schedule still prices one
Threshold Criteria §XXVIII states the rule without qualification: "All Applicants must waive their right to request early termination of the extended use agreement through the Qualified Contract process. This waiver does not preclude the option for transfers of ownership that maintain the affordability or for a request for a subsequent allocation of credits beyond the Compliance Period." On the Scoring side, the Extended Affordability Commitment category (up to 6 points) awards 5 of those points where the Project Team contains no Principal who has requested a Qualified Contract in Georgia on or after May 20, 2025 (Scoring §III.A) — a compliance-history screen tied to a specific look-back date, not a mechanism that lets an owner buy out of the mandatory waiver by scoring well.
DCA's own compliance manual makes clear the blanket waiver is a feature of current-cycle awards layered onto an older portfolio, not a universal historical fact: "As part of the DCA/GHFA LIHTC QAP process, some projects have elected to waive completely or defer their right to request a qualified contract for a certain number of years. Owners should review their applications and recorded LURCs to determine whether there has been such a waiver for the project." Consistent with that, DCA's published Compliance Monitoring Fee Table still lists live pricing for the process: a $2,500 Qualified Contract Eligibility Determination fee, a $7,500 Qualified Contract Request fee, and a case-by-case Qualified Contract Inspection fee that requires 100% unit inspection. For any LURC recorded under the 2026-2027 QAP, that fee schedule should be functionally moot given the mandatory waiver — but it remains live for whatever portion of DCA's existing portfolio was awarded under an older QAP that didn't require the waiver, or that still carries opt-out language from before roughly the mid-2000s.
On the specific question of whether Georgia offers a scoring incentive for voluntarily extending affordability beyond the 30-year floor: a full-text search of the amended 2026-2027 QAP found none. The Extended Affordability Commitment category's other two components are a Resident Ownership point for a plan submitted at the end of the fifteen-year Compliance Period (single-family styled units only) and a Right of First Refusal point (see below) — neither rewards additional years of restriction, and this research found no separate scoring line anywhere in the QAP for a 40-, 45-, or 50-year voluntary commitment.
Two Rights of First Refusal that shouldn't be conflated
Georgia runs two separate ROFR mechanisms with different triggers, eligibility standards, and pricing. The first is mandatory for any deal using the Non-Profit Set Aside: Threshold Criteria §XXI.F requires the Applicant to incorporate an acknowledgment of the nonprofit general partner's IRC §42(i)(7) Right of First Refusal into the equity commitment letter and the Limited Partnership Agreement or a separate ROFR Agreement, at "a minimum purchase price equivalent to the outstanding debt plus exit taxes" — the statutory §42(i)(7)(B) floor — and DCA reviews the LPA or ROFR agreement before it will issue Form 8609.
The second is elective and open to for-profit and nonprofit sponsors alike: Scoring Criteria §III.C awards a single point for committing to a DCA-run Right of First Refusal process, detailed in Exhibit A to Scoring Criteria. That process only triggers when a third party actually makes an offer on the property or an ownership interest; DCA then commissions an appraisal (paid for by the Owner) within 30 days of the Owner's notification, and posts the property on its website once a maximum allowable price is set — the greater of the §42(i)(7) statutory minimum or the appraised as-is restricted fair market value. The posting period runs up to 180 days, during which only a buyer meeting DCA's eligibility bar may make an offer: a nonprofit must qualify under §42(h)(5)(C), and any buyer (nonprofit or for-profit) must have earned DCA's highest developer-qualification rating in a tax-credit-application review within the preceding five years. If an eligible buyer offers the maximum price and the Owner declines, the ROFR requirement is not satisfied and the Owner cannot then accept a third-party offer once the posting period ends. Ownership transfers for resyndication purposes are explicitly exempted from triggering either ROFR mechanism.
Compliance monitoring during the 15-year Compliance Period tracks the federal floor exactly
DCA's compliance manual states the review standard in federal terms: "State housing agencies are required to review LIHTC projects at least once every 3 years. As a part of the review, DCA/GHFA will generally physically inspect the property and at least 20% of the low-income units and the same percentage of household files." Larger properties may draw a smaller sample under IRS/HUD guidance, the first inspection for a new project must occur no later than the end of the second year of the credit period, notice of an inspection is given no more than 15 days in advance, and postponing a scheduled inspection is not permitted. None of this exceeds the federal minimum under Treas. Reg. §1.42-5 — Georgia does not layer a stricter inspection cadence or larger sample size on top of it during the initial 15 years.
| Requirement | Years 1-15 (Compliance Period) | Years 16+ (Extended Use Period) |
|---|---|---|
| Inspection cadence | At least once every 3 years; ≥20% of units and files | At least every 3 to 5 years, or more often at DCA's discretion; often "windshield" (exterior/systems/common-area) only |
| Correction period for noncompliance | Up to 45 days from notice; extendable up to 6 months total for good cause | Up to 90 days; generally 45 days, extendable up to an additional 45 days for good cause |
| Form 8823 filing | Required — filed no later than 45 days after the correction period ends | Not required — no federal tax impact after Year 15 |
| Annual Owner's Certification | Required | Required, for the entire Extended Use Period |
| Tenant data/transaction reporting | Required monthly | Required, for the entire Extended Use Period |
| Consequence of noncompliance | Recapture risk; Form 8823 to IRS; future-scoring impact | No recapture risk, but classified as noncompliance and still affects future DCA funding/scoring |
A separate, easy-to-miss deadline sits inside the first 18 months rather than on the 3-year inspection cycle: DCA requires a first-year tenant file review and clearance letter from an "industry recognized HTC training and file review specialist," with the findings submitted to DCA within 18 months of the first building's placed-in-service date. Missing that submission affects future 9% scoring under Compliance Performance and can cost the property its eligibility for a Recertification Waiver (the ability to move 100%-LIHTC properties to tenant self-certification for subsequent annual recertifications).
Noncompliance consequences also run through a dedicated Compliance Performance scoring category that operates independently of Form 8823 and applies whether the noncompliance happened during or after the 15-year Compliance Period: every Application starts with 10 Performance Points, a 5-point deduction applies for each Significant Adverse Event for which a waiver was granted or renewed, a 2-point deduction applies for each Adverse Circumstance, and negative compliance history is not erased by a Principal's resignation, removal, or the sale of the noncompliant property — a departing Principal must claim that history for three years after leaving. This scoring mechanism is effectively DCA's substitute for the federal recapture threat once a property ages out of the compliance period and Form 8823 stops applying.
Fees: one payment meant to cover the full 15-year Compliance Period, plus a longer list for everything else
| Fee | Amount | Due date |
|---|---|---|
| Credit Compliance Monitoring Fee (per unit, all project units) | $800 (9% credits); $800 (Bond/4% credits); $1,000 (Average Income deals); $1,500 (single-family detached or duplexes) | No later than the Placed in Service date |
| Re-Inspection or Additional Inspection fee | $150 per unit | Within 15 days of DCA's invoice |
| Noncompliance fee | $250 per instance per month until corrected | Within 15 days of DCA's invoice |
| HOME Asset Management Fee (HOME-funded properties) | $750 per project annually | Beginning no later than 24 months after HOME construction loan closing |
| Management Company Change/Approval Fee | $500 first property; $150 per additional property (max $2,000); $250 penalty for an unapproved change | At time of request |
| Qualified Contract fees | $2,500 (Eligibility Determination); $7,500 (QC Request); case-by-case (QC Inspection, 100% unit inspection required) | Upon receipt of invoice |
The QAP's own Fees section confirms the per-unit Credit Compliance Monitoring Fee is not an annual charge: "DCA charges a monitoring fee for all Credit developments. Credit recipients will be required to pay the entire fee covering the fifteen-year Compliance Period" (Core Plan §IX.A) — a single, one-time payment due at placed in service. Recurring per-unit compliance charges during the Compliance Period are the exception, not the rule: they show up only where non-compliance drives a re-inspection or noncompliance fee, or where HOME funds bring a genuinely annual Asset Management Fee into play for the life of the Period of Affordability. Separately, DCA reports its own compliance-monitoring activity to the IRS annually on Form 8610 (Compliance Appendix ¶O) — an agency-side reporting obligation, not an owner deliverable, but a useful marker that DCA's federal reporting duty continues independent of any individual property's Form 8823 history.
No blanket property-tax exemption, and a state credit under new legislative pressure
Georgia has no automatic property-tax exemption tied to LIHTC status. O.C.G.A. §8-3-8 exempts a housing project from ad valorem taxes and special assessments only for the portion of the project — the eligible housing units occupied or reserved for low-income persons — that is subject to a "private enterprise agreement" with a local housing authority as defined at O.C.G.A. §8-3-3(13.1)(C); the agreement must be finalized by December 31 of the year preceding the tax year, and the exemption application is due by April 1 of that tax year. The QAP treats this as an optional, deal-specific structure rather than a program-wide benefit: Scoring Criteria's Property Cost Reduction category awards a single point where "a Private Enterprise Agreement will reduce property taxes," supported by a preliminary agreement and a legal opinion confirming the relevant authority's ability to enter into it and that it will actually reduce property taxes. A Georgia LIHTC property that hasn't structured itself through a qualifying housing-authority partnership gets no property-tax break from its LIHTC status alone.
Georgia's State Housing Tax Credit runs alongside the federal credit under O.C.G.A. §48-7-29.6, with a parallel version for insurance companies at §33-1-18: the amount claimed under the two statutes combined "shall...in no event exceed an amount equal to the federal housing tax credit," unused credit carries forward three years, and the credit applies to buildings placed in service after January 1, 2001. Its recapture rule tracks federal recapture proportionally — "the state recapture amount shall be equal to the proportion of the state tax credit claimed by the taxpayer that equals the proportion the federal recapture amount bears to the original federal housing tax credit amount subject to recapture" — but carries an explicit carve-out found in relatively few states' statutes: the state credit "shall not be subject to recapture if such recapture is due solely to the sale or transfer of any direct or indirect interest" in the project. A federal recapture triggered by a straight ownership-interest sale or transfer, in other words, does not by itself pull back the Georgia state credit.
One internal inconsistency is worth flagging rather than silently correcting: the QAP's own Definitions section (Core Plan §II) states, verbatim, "'State Credit' means the Housing Tax Credit as set forth in O.C.G.A. §48-7-29 and §33-1-18" — omitting the ".6" that actually appears in the codified statute. Independent verification (and the very statute that Georgia's 2026 conformity bill amended) confirms the real citation is §48-7-29.6, not the bare §48-7-29. Treat the QAP's own text as an internal drafting imprecision rather than evidence that a second, different state credit statute exists.
That statute is under active legislative pressure as of this QAP cycle. Georgia House Bill 1199, signed by Governor Kemp and effective March 20, 2026, amended O.C.G.A. §48-7-29.6 to cap the combined aggregate amount of 9% and 4% Georgia Housing Tax Credits awarded at no more than $100 million per year for taxable years 2026 through 2028. DCA's own August 2026 QAP amendment memo cites HB 1199 directly as the reason it reopened this QAP to add stricter geographic-distribution rules for 4%/bond non-set-aside awards — a scoring and allocation change, not anything touching the compliance or Year 15 provisions covered here, but the clearest evidence available that the QAP in hand is current rather than a document already overtaken by legislative change.
Where this goes wrong
- Assuming Georgia's extended-use term runs 55 years because that's this cross-state guide's default phase framing. DCA's own compliance manual and the QAP's own Extended Use Period definition confirm the floor is 30 years (15 + 15), not 55, though a specific LURC can run longer case by case.
- Assuming the mandatory Qualified Contract waiver (Threshold §XXVIII) means DCA no longer processes QC requests at all. DCA's own published fee schedule still prices a QC Eligibility Determination ($2,500), a QC Request ($7,500), and a 100%-unit QC Inspection — pricing that remains live for whatever part of DCA's existing portfolio predates the current mandatory waiver.
- Conflating Georgia's two Right of First Refusal mechanisms. The mandatory §42(i)(7) nonprofit-set-aside ROFR (Threshold §XXI.F, reviewed before 8609 issuance) and the elective 1-point Scoring ROFR (Scoring §III.C, a DCA-run 180-day posting process open to for-profit and nonprofit sponsors alike) have different triggers, different eligible-buyer standards, and different price mechanics.
- Expecting a scoring bonus for voluntarily extending affordability beyond the 30-year floor. A full-text search of the 2026-2027 QAP found no such category — the Extended Affordability Commitment points reward a clean Qualified-Contract-request history, a resident-ownership exit plan, and a ROFR commitment, not additional years of restriction.
- Assuming inspection frequency and cure periods stay on the Years 1-15 cadence into the extended-use tail. DCA's Compliance Manual Chapter 11 drops inspections to every 3-5 years (often windshield-only) and stops requiring Form 8823 filings, while still requiring Annual Owner Certifications and tenant-data reporting for the entire Extended Use Period and still tracking noncompliance for future-round scoring.
- Treating the Credit Compliance Monitoring Fee as an annual charge. It's a one-time, per-unit fee due no later than the placed-in-service date that the QAP itself says is meant to cover the entire 15-year Compliance Period; recurring per-unit compliance charges are the exception (non-compliance-driven fees, or a genuinely annual HOME Asset Management Fee), not the rule.
- Assuming a property automatically gets a property-tax break because it carries LIHTC restrictions. O.C.G.A. §8-3-8's exemption reaches only the low-income units under a Private Enterprise Agreement with a housing authority — a deal-specific structure the owner has to put in place and apply for (by April 1) — and is worth at most a single QAP scoring point, not a program-wide benefit.
- Relying on the QAP's own text to identify the state tax credit statute. Core Plan §II cites "O.C.G.A. §48-7-29" for the State Credit, omitting the ".6"; the actual codified provision, confirmed independently and by the statute HB 1199 amended in 2026, is §48-7-29.6.
- Assuming the Georgia state tax credit is uncapped or automatic. HB 1199 (effective March 20, 2026) caps the combined annual 9% and 4% state credit at $100 million for tax years 2026-2028, and the credit under §48-7-29.6 combined with the insurer-side §33-1-18 credit can never in any event exceed the federal credit amount.
- Assuming state-credit recapture always mirrors federal recapture one-for-one. §48-7-29.6 recapture is proportional to the federal recapture percentage, but a sale or transfer of a direct or indirect ownership interest that triggers federal recapture does not, by itself, trigger state recapture — an explicit statutory carve-out.
- Not verifying "Addendum D" before relying on its exact terms. The QAP cites Addendum D §II(A)(2) as the source of a 2-point Annual Owner Certification late-filing penalty (Compliance Appendix ¶D), but that document is not itself reproduced in the public QAP or the 2024 Compliance Manual text reviewed for this research — confirm its current content directly with DCA.
- HUD
- LIHTC
- State QAPs
- IRS § 42
- Housing Finance Agencies