"DHCD runs the federal 9 percent competitive credit and the federal 4 percent credit paired with tax-exempt bonds through one CDA-administered QAP, and the 2026 QAP just added a second, larger 9 percent award tier — but is there a Maryland state tax credit riding on top of either track, does Baltimore City run its own separate process the way Chicago does in Illinois, and did the bond-financing test actually catch up with the federal One Big Beautiful Bill Act change?"
One QAP, two federal tracks, and CDA wearing both hats
The Governor of Maryland has designated the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) as the state's LIHTC-allocating agency; DHCD's Secretary has assigned that function to the Community Development Administration (CDA), a unit of DHCD's Division of Development Finance. CDA administers the program under the Housing and Community Development Article, §§4-101 through 4-255 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and COMAR Title 05, Subtitle 05, Chapter 06. The 2026 Qualified Allocation Plan states the split directly: "LIHTC are reserved for eligible housing projects on a competitive basis, except those financed with tax-exempt bonds, which are awarded on a non-competitive project-by-project basis." Projects seeking the non-competitive route must still clear the Guide's Threshold Criteria and Competitive Scoring Criteria and comply with the Allocation Plan — they simply are not ranked against other applicants for a share of the state's annual per-capita ceiling.
CDA is not just the credit allocator on the bond side — it is also, itself, the bond issuer of record for Maryland's Multifamily Bond Program (MBP), which "increase[s] the construction and rehabilitation of multifamily rental housing for families with limited incomes" using tax-exempt bonds and notes that CDA issues directly, then lends the proceeds to a project at a rate based on CDA's own bond rate over terms generally running 30 to 40 years. All MBP-financed projects must be credit-enhanced to at least an "AA" rating from CDA's rating services unless CDA approves an alternative structure. A sponsor is not limited to CDA as issuer, however: the QAP separately provides for "Locally Issued Bonds" — tax-exempt bonds issued by a local jurisdiction requesting 4% LIHTC — for which "CDA will not perform the feasibility determination on behalf of the local jurisdiction unless the issuing local jurisdiction submits a written request to CDA," and a complete CDA Application Submission Package is still required to request the 4% credit itself.
| Track | Rationing mechanism | Bond issuer options | 2026 award ceiling per project |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9% competitive | Scored — 221-point Competitive Scoring Criteria, two rounds a year, no published minimum score for the general pool | Not applicable | $30,000/restricted unit up to $1,500,000, or $28,000/unit up to $2,000,000 (whichever formula yields more) |
| 4%/bond, non-competitive | As-of-right once threshold criteria and CDA's feasibility determination are met — no score, no ranking, no fixed round | CDA's own Multifamily Bond Program, or a local jurisdiction's own tax-exempt bond issuance | Not subject to the $1.5M/$2M competitive cap — limited only by the Internal Revenue Code and CDA's own feasibility determination |
2026 Qualified Allocation Plan, Sections A.1, B.1, B.2, C.1, D.2; 2026 Multifamily Rental Financing Program Guide, Section 3.8.
The 2026 QAP's real numbers: two rounds, a raised award ceiling, and no minimum score
The current QAP is effective April 8, 2026 — approved by Governor Wes Moore following a public hearing held March 25, 2026 — and supersedes the QAP approved January 23, 2025. Maryland's Allocation Plan has been amended on a near-annual cadence since the Governor first approved one on April 5, 1990; the 2026 version's own cover page lists every intervening amendment date back to that year. Two changes distinguish 2026 from 2025 directly. First, DHCD now runs two competitive LIHTC rounds a year rather than one — a Spring/Summer round and a Fall/Winter round. Second, the 2026 Guide added a whole new way to size a competitive 9% award: where the 2025 Guide capped a competitive reservation at "no more than $30,000 per income restricted unit up to $1.5 million," full stop, the 2026 Guide adds a second, alternative formula — "$28,000 per LIHTC income restricted unit up to $2 million" — and lets a sponsor use whichever produces the larger award.
| Units | Formula A: $30,000/unit, capped at $1,500,000 | Formula B: $28,000/unit, capped at $2,000,000 | Larger formula |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | $900,000 | $840,000 | A, by $60,000 |
| 50 | $1,500,000 (at cap) | $1,400,000 | A, by $100,000 |
| 54 | $1,500,000 (capped) | $1,512,000 | B, by $12,000 |
| 60 | $1,500,000 (capped) | $1,680,000 | B, by $180,000 |
| 72 | $1,500,000 (capped) | $2,000,000 (at cap) | B, by $500,000 |
| 100 | $1,500,000 (capped) | $2,000,000 (capped) | B, by $500,000 |
Computed by this research directly from the two formulas stated in the 2026 Multifamily Rental Financing Program Guide, Section 3.8 — DHCD does not publish this comparison table itself. The crossover sits at roughly 54 units; below that, the original $30,000/unit formula wins outright, and above it, the new $28,000/unit formula wins by a growing margin until both formulas are simply capped, at which point Formula B's $2,000,000 ceiling is worth a flat $500,000 more than Formula A's $1,500,000 ceiling.
DHCD's own Spring/Summer 2026 round produced real, if modest, application volume: 10 applications requesting $12,910,000 in federal 9% LIHTC, $13,750,000 in Rental Housing Financing Program (RHFP) funds, and $2,000,000 in HOME funds, proposing 477 units across seven counties and Baltimore City, including one project that paired 9% LIHTC with simultaneous MBP/4% LIHTC ("twinning" — see below). The Fall/Winter 2026 round's own notice set the interest-rate assumption for underwriting at 6.9% and the LIHTC equity "raise-up rate" used in scoring the Leveraging category at $0.84 per credit dollar, and it expressly waived the QAP's ordinary requirement that every competitive application score at least 2 of the 10 available Housing Starts Now points — both real, round-specific administrative choices that live in DHCD's own competitive-round notices (numbered sequentially, e.g., 26-09 through 26-12 for 2026) rather than in the QAP or Guide text itself. As of this research, the Fall/Winter round's application results had not yet been published.
Unlike Colorado, which gates its competitive rounds behind published minimum scores of 130, 115, or 95 points depending on the track, Maryland's Competitive Scoring Criteria sums to 221 total points across eight categories (plus up to 10 additional, discretionary State Bonus Points DHCD may award outside that scale) — and nothing in the QAP or Guide states a minimum score an application must clear to be eligible for an award in the general competitive pool. The only hard score gates in the 2026 QAP are narrower: the Permanent Supportive Housing Set-Aside requires minimum sub-scores in three specific categories, and every general-pool application (absent a round-specific waiver, as happened in Fall/Winter 2026) must score at least 2 of 10 points under the "Housing Starts Now" readiness incentive.
This research could not confirm Maryland's total annual federal 9% credit ceiling directly from a DHCD primary source. Secondary sources describe "approximately $30 million" in annual per-capita credit authority; applying the federal per-capita formula directly — $3.416 per resident for 2026, per IRS Revenue Procedure 2025-32 as corrected upward for the One Big Beautiful Bill Act's 12% increase to the 9% ceiling — against a 2025 Census Bureau population estimate for Maryland of roughly 6,265,000 residents yields a figure closer to $21.4 million from the per-capita formula alone, before any carryforward or national-pool credits are added. That gap between the commonly repeated $30 million figure and this research's own computation from primary federal inputs was not resolved in this session; confirm CDA's own stated 2026 ceiling directly before modeling total annual 9% supply.
The federal bond test: still a flat 50 percent on paper, silent on the 2025 federal change
A bond-financed 4% deal's threshold for receiving credit outside the state's annual ceiling is stated twice in the 2026 QAP, in materially identical terms both times: "Projects with 50% or more of their development and acquisition costs financed with the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds may receive LIHTC on the entire qualified LIHTC basis outside the State's annual allocation of tax credits" (Section C.1), and, in the compliance-monitoring context, a reference to "buildings of which 50% or more of the aggregate basis (taking into account the building and the land) is financed with the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds" (Section H.5). Neither the QAP nor the 220-page Multifamily Rental Financing Program Guide mentions the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Public Law 119-21, or a 25 percent alternative anywhere in their text — a direct search of both documents for those terms returned zero results in this research.
That silence is notable next to how other states have handled the same federal change. The longstanding federal rule under IRC §42(h)(4)(B) required at least 50 percent of a project's aggregate basis to be tax-exempt-bond financed; the 2025 Act (Pub. L. 119-21, §70422(b)(1)) added a lower 25 percent alternative for bonds issued after December 31, 2025, where at least 5 percent of aggregate basis is financed by those newer bonds. States including Colorado, Georgia, and Illinois have all either amended their QAP text or layered a separate administrative ceiling on top of the new federal floor since the Act passed in July 2025. Maryland's QAP — adopted April 8, 2026, a full nine months after the Act's enactment — still states only the old 50 percent number, with no indication anywhere in its own text of whether CDA has adopted an administrative position on the new 25 percent alternative at all. Whether that reflects a considered decision to keep the higher, more conservative 50 percent floor, or simply an as-yet-unaddressed gap in the QAP's drafting, could not be determined from the documents reviewed in this research.
Baltimore City: real set-asides and leverage programs, not a separate allocating agency
Illinois's Chicago runs its own, entirely separate Qualified Allocation Plan and its own federal 9% credit ceiling, because Chicago is a "constitutional home rule city" under IRC §42(h)(3)(D). That status is defined, by cross-reference at 26 U.S.C. §146(d)(3)(C), as "any political subdivision of a State which, under a State constitution which was adopted in 1970 and effective on July 1, 1971, had home rule powers on the 1st day of the calendar year" — language written for, and in practice reaching, only jurisdictions under a home-rule constitution adopted on that specific 1970/1971 timeline (Illinois's 1970 Constitution, effective July 1, 1971, is the paradigm case). Maryland's constitutional home-rule provisions — Article XI-A, dating to 1915, and the later Article XI-E for municipalities — do not meet that test. Baltimore City, in other words, does not qualify as a constitutional home rule city for federal LIHTC or private-activity-bond volume-cap purposes, and it does not run a separate QAP, a separate credit ceiling, or a separate bond volume cap the way Chicago does. Every Baltimore-sited LIHTC application competes inside the same statewide DHCD/CDA pool as an application from any other Maryland jurisdiction.
That does not mean Baltimore is undifferentiated inside the QAP. The Guide's own Direct Leveraging scoring category lists "Project CORE or Baltimore Vacants Reinvestment Initiative (BVRI) funds awarded by DHCD" and "Strategic Demolition funds awarded by DHCD" as eligible non-state leveraged resources a Baltimore-area application can bring to the table for points — real, DHCD-administered, Baltimore-focused programs that stack on top of an LIHTC award rather than substituting for one. A Baltimore sponsor is applying through the same statewide process as everywhere else, but with real, additional local leverage programs available to strengthen that application.
Twinning: Maryland's hybrid pathway, on a genuinely tight clock
Maryland's version of a 9%/4% hybrid is called "twinning": one 9% LIHTC project and one MBP/4% LIHTC project on the same common plan of development, or on a larger development located on the same, contiguous, or proximate sites (DHCD itself determines whether an assemblage of sites is "proximate" based on whether it can be built in a single construction period). The clock starts the moment a 9% reservation letter is issued: the corresponding 4% application must be received within 90 days, and the two components must reach initial closing within 90 days of each other. Subsequent phases of an already-reserved project must separately demonstrate "Sustaining Occupancy" on the prior phase — a minimum of three months of break-even operations at 90 percent or greater occupancy — before a new phase's application will be considered.
Twinning also changes the developer-fee math: rather than each component earning its own fee under the ordinary formulas, "the total combined Developer's Fee will be the lower of the calculation below or $5 million" — a single, combined ceiling across both the 9% and 4%/MBP pieces of the deal. DHCD's own 2026 Spring/Summer round data shows this structure is genuinely in use, not just a theoretical option: one of the ten applications in that round was a twinning application pairing 9% LIHTC with simultaneous MBP/4% LIHTC.
Where this goes wrong
- Assuming the 2026 QAP's 50 percent bond-financing test already reflects the One Big Beautiful Bill Act's 25 percent alternative — both places the QAP states the test (Section C.1's development/acquisition-cost version and Section H.5's aggregate-basis version) use only "50% or more," and neither the QAP nor the Guide mentions the Act, Public Law 119-21, or a 25 percent test anywhere in their text; confirm CDA's current administrative position and bond counsel's own read before sizing a 2026-vintage bond deal to anything below 50 percent.
- Treating the State Basis Boost as Maryland's version of a state tax credit — it is a basis adjustment under IRC §42(d)(5)(B)(v), not a separate credit instrument; it is categorically unavailable to bond-financed (4%) deals, and it cannot be combined with the federal QCT/DDA boost on the same project.
- Confusing the Qualified Workforce Housing Tax Credit with a LIHTC-stacking state credit — it is a distinct income tax credit under Tax-General Article §10-749, scoped to workforce housing (50-100% AMI) inside federal Opportunity Zones, administered under an entirely different subtitle of the Housing and Community Development Article than CDA's LIHTC authority.
- Assuming Baltimore City runs its own separate QAP or federal credit ceiling the way Chicago does in Illinois — the "constitutional home rule city" carve-out under IRC §42(h)(3)(D) and 26 U.S.C. §146(d)(3)(C) is defined by reference to a state constitution "adopted in 1970 and effective on July 1, 1971," a test Maryland's home-rule provisions (Article XI-A, 1915) don't meet; a Baltimore-sited deal competes in the same statewide pool as every other Maryland application.
- Assuming a competitive score has to clear some published minimum to be funded the way Colorado's 130/115/95-point gates work — Maryland's 221-point Competitive Scoring Criteria carries no stated minimum threshold for the general pool; only the PSH Set-Aside's sub-score minimums and the 2-point Housing Starts Now floor (itself waivable round-by-round, as happened in Fall/Winter 2026) function as hard gates.
- Sizing a competitive 9% award using only the original $30,000-per-unit/$1.5 million formula — the 2026 QAP added a second, alternative $28,000-per-unit/$2 million formula that produces a larger award for any project of roughly 54 units or more; run both formulas and use whichever is larger.
- Assuming a bond-financed (4%/MBP) deal is subject to the same $1.5 million/$2 million competitive award cap as the general pool — non-competitive allocations under IRC §42(h)(4)(B) are explicitly excluded from that cap and are limited only by the Internal Revenue Code and CDA's own feasibility determination.
- Treating the 90-day twinning windows as flexible — the Guide requires the 4% application within 90 days of the 9% reservation letter, and both components must reach initial closing within 90 days of each other; the combined developer fee across both pieces is separately capped at the lower of the standard formula or a flat $5 million, not the sum of two full, independent fees.
- Reading a round-specific number (an interest-rate assumption, a tax-credit equity raise-up rate, or a waiver of the Housing Starts Now score floor) out of the base QAP or Guide text — those figures are set fresh in DHCD's sequentially numbered competitive-round notices (Notice 26-09 through 26-12 for 2026, for example) and can change from round to round within the same QAP cycle.
- HUD
- LIHTC
- State QAPs
- IRS § 42
- Housing Finance Agencies
