Browse other state and territory guides
"Do we even want to compete for 9% credits, or does the 4%/bond route get us there faster with less risk?"
How EZFeasi helps at this stage
Use scenarios and the Unit Mixer to explore unit counts, affordability and financing alternatives. Put those results beside published applications and awards as you shape your competition strategy.
The 9% round: a 100-point formula that has nothing to do with the tiebreakers
OHFA's 2026-2027 9% LIHTC QAP scores every Proposal Application on three weighted criteria that sum to 100 points: a Neighborhood Opportunity Index (40 points, 40%), a Housing Needs Index (35 points, 35%), and the Annual LIHTC Request per LIHTC Unit (25 points, 25%). The first two are census-tract measures built with the Urban Institute and auto-calculated in OHFA's application workbook (the AHFA) from each site's address — a sponsor doesn't compute them, but does choose the site that scores well on them. The third is the only criterion a sponsor directly controls: requesting less credit per unit buys points.
OHFA board-approved a Technical Amendment to this QAP on August 20, 2026 that reset the Annual LIHTC Request per Unit thresholds (they reindex annually to the Multifamily Residential Construction Index). A request of $29,500 or less in annual 9% LIHTC per unit earns the full 25 points; points decline on a straight line to zero at $51,000 or more, per the formula OHFA publishes directly in the QAP: =MAX(0, MIN(25, ((51,000 − Annual LIHTC Request per Unit) / 21,500) × 25)). The prior thresholds — $27,935 and $48,252 — appear in the original PY2026-2027 QAP text the Technical Amendment superseded; use the amended figures for any 2026-2027 round application.
Credits are awarded within four funding pools, each competing against itself rather than against the whole state: New Affordability – General Occupancy (39% of the annual 9% ceiling), New Affordability – Seniors (26%), Preserved Affordability (13%), and Tenant Populations with Special Housing Needs (22%). A project must first clear its pool's threshold requirements — for the two New Affordability pools, that includes an Extremely Low-Income (ELI) unit requirement: 15% of units at or below 30% AMI if the site's census tract has a Housing Needs Index raw score of 45 or below, or only 10% if the tract scores above 45 — before its 100-point score is ever compared to anyone else's.
The tiebreaker lists inside each pool are a genuinely separate competition from scoring. They reuse the raw, unweighted Neighborhood Opportunity and Housing Needs Index values (not the weighted points that decided the scoring round) alongside factors like census-tract award recency, bedroom count, unit count, historic-tax-credit use, and ELI percentage — and none of the four pools' tiebreaker lists reference the Annual LIHTC Request per Unit criterion at all. A sponsor who wins on price-per-unit and loses on score, or vice versa, is navigating two different rubrics, not one.
The 4% track: rolling applications, an uncapped developer fee dollar limit, and a bond volume-cap gamble
The 4% program runs under its own 4% LIHTC Qualified Allocation Plan (effective March 19, 2025), a genuinely different document from the 9% QAP — non-competitive, no 100-point rubric, no per-capita credit ceiling. A '4% LIHTC Only' application (no OHFA gap financing layered in) is accepted on a rolling, first-come-first-served basis once Experience and Capacity Review opens each February.
The tradeoff is structural, not administrative: to claim the full 4% credit, at least 50% of a project's aggregate basis must be funded with tax-exempt §142(d) private activity bonds (PABs) per 26 U.S.C. §42(h)(4)(B) — fall short of 50% and the credit pro-rates down on the shortfall, cutting the resulting allocation by more than half in a typical structure. OHFA's own QAP illustrates the gap on a $15 million basis project: a 9% deal generates roughly $1,350,000 in annual credit against $600,000 for an equivalent 4% deal — about 72% of total development cost funded by LIHTC equity on the 9% side versus 32% on the 4% side, with the difference made up elsewhere in the capital stack.
PABs are themselves scarce. Ohio's total annual state private-activity-bond volume cap is administered by the Ohio Department of Development under OAC Chapter 122-4, but the slice actually available to residential rental projects is narrower: the lesser of $120 million or 15% of the state's total ceiling is set aside for residential rental under OAC 122-4-02. Unused cap carries forward three calendar years under 26 U.S.C. §142(k)(5)(B)(ii). When that set-aside runs tight in a given year, OHFA prioritizes 4% requests using the federal statutory preferences at 26 U.S.C. §42(m)(1)(B) (serving the lowest-income tenants, longest affordability commitments) and the selection criteria at §42(m)(1)(C) — meaning a 'non-competitive' credit can still function competitively in a volume-cap-constrained year.
There is no published twinning or hybrid mechanism combining 9% and 4% resources on the same deal in either current QAP. The closest thing to a cross-program rule runs the opposite direction: Preserved Affordability projects with more than 70 total units located in a Qualified Census Tract are barred outright from the 9% round unless the sponsor submits a data-supported narrative — at least 60 days before the Proposal Application deadline, with OHFA approval required at least 30 days out — proving the project is infeasible using 4% LIHTC with tax-exempt bonds. In practice, OHFA is pushing larger preservation deals toward 4% by default and requiring an affirmative case to do otherwise.
Fees and the developer-fee ceiling that actually binds
All OHFA application fees — 9%, 4%, and the Bond Gap Financing (BGF) layer that pairs 4% credits with Ohio Housing Trust Fund, National Housing Trust Fund, or HOME gap resources — are non-refundable and must be paid by ACH. OHFA does not accept checks and has no online payment portal; wiring instructions are posted on its File Transfer Site. A 4% deal that also draws BGF gap financing pays BGF's own $2,500 Proposal and $2,500 Final Application fees in addition to the base 4% fees, except that BGF's $2,500 Final Application fee replaces (not stacks on top of) the 4% program's own $3,500 Final Application fee.
Both programs cap the maximum budgeted developer fee — which bundles the Developer Fee itself with application/consultant, construction management, guarantee, developer-charged financing, and developer-charged asset management fees — at 20% of LIHTC eligible basis net of those same fees. Only the 9% program adds a hard $3 million dollar ceiling on top of the percentage; the 4% QAP states no equivalent dollar cap, which matters most on a large bond-financed transaction where 20% of basis would otherwise run well past what a 9% deal could ever collect.
Don't confuse either fee schedule with OHFA's 2026 Additional Credits Policy (also board-approved August 20, 2026) — a narrow $1,450,000 gap-funding pool, capped at $110,000 per project, available only to already-awarded 2022-2025 9% deals facing documented cost overruns before placement in service. Program Year 2026-2027 awardees are explicitly ineligible, and every dollar drawn costs the sponsor's development team 0.1 scoring point per $10,000 requested on every project it submits in the following 9% round. It is a cost-overrun rescue mechanism, not a way to blend 9% and 4% resources.
Checks before you move forward
- Reading the New Affordability pool's 15%/10% ELI split as a scoring input — it is a pool threshold requirement gated by the census tract's Housing Needs Index raw score, decided before the 100-point competition even runs.
- Assuming the raw Neighborhood Opportunity and Housing Needs Index values used in tiebreakers are the same as the weighted points used in scoring — tiebreakers use the unweighted raw score, and the Annual LIHTC Request per Unit criterion never appears in any pool's tiebreaker list at all.
- Sizing a 4% deal against Ohio's full multi-billion-dollar statewide PAB volume cap — the actual competing pool for residential rental is the lesser of $120 million or 15% of that ceiling (OAC 122-4-02), and it can be exhausted by other private activities in a busy year.
- Assuming a same-site 9%/4% twinning or hybrid structure is available on request — no such mechanism appears in either current QAP; the only cross-program rule OHFA publishes runs the other way, barring large (>70-unit) Preserved Affordability deals in a QCT from the 9% round absent a pre-cleared infeasibility narrative.
- Budgeting the 9% program's 20%-of-basis developer fee without checking the hard $3 million dollar cap — a large 9% deal can hit that ceiling well before the percentage does; the 4% program carries no equivalent dollar ceiling.
- Trying to pay OHFA application, reservation, or compliance fees by check or through an online portal — OHFA accepts ACH only, wired per instructions on its File Transfer Site.
- Treating OHFA's 2026 Additional Credits Policy as a way to add 4%-style flexibility to a 9% deal — it's a narrow, deadline-driven cost-overrun top-up for already-awarded prior-round projects only, and it carries a real scoring penalty against the sponsor's future 9% submissions.
- Assuming the 4% credit is truly 'non-competitive' in every year — when PAB volume cap runs scarce, OHFA prioritizes requests using the federal statutory preferences at §42(m)(1)(B)-(C), so a weak applicant on those factors can still be pushed to the back of the queue.
- HUD
- LIHTC
- State QAPs
- IRS § 42
- Housing Finance Agencies
