"Everyone tells me shipping and imported materials make building on Guam brutally expensive, and that the island's building code has to survive typhoons most states never see — so where in GHURA's QAP is the higher cost cap or the wind-load requirement that accounts for either one?"
No cost cap, no contractor-fee cap — GHURA scores the developer fee instead of capping it
A direct text search of both the 2024 and 2025 QAPs for a Total Development Cost limit, a per-unit or per-square-foot cost cap, and any contractor fee, general requirements, overhead, or profit ceiling turned up nothing. GHURA does not describe a maximum allowable cost of any kind. The one cost-related lever the QAP does use is Criteria 15, which scores (but does not cap) the total Developer Fee as a percentage of total development cost excluding developer fee and reserves. The QAP defines Developer Fee broadly — "total fees paid to the Developer, including, but is not limited to, consulting fees, project management fees, developer overhead, and developer fees" — while carving out "Architectural, Engineering, Accounting, and Legal fees," which are not counted toward the fee percentage at all.
| New Construction fee | Points | Acquisition/Rehab — Fee on Acquisition | Points | Acquisition/Rehab — Fee on Rehabilitation | Points |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18% > Fee ≥ 16% | 0 | 13% > Fee ≥ 11% | 0 | 18% > Fee ≥ 16% | 0 |
| 16% > Fee ≥ 14% | 1 | 11% > Fee ≥ 9% | 1 | 16% > Fee ≥ 14% | 1 |
| 14% > Fee ≥ 12% | 2 | Fee < 9% | 3 | 14% > Fee ≥ 12% | 2 |
| 12% > Fee ≥ 10% | 3 | — | — | Fee < 9% | 4 |
| 10% > Fee ≥ 8% | 5 | — | — | — | — |
| Fee < 8% | 7 | — | — | — | — |
2025 QAP, Criteria 15. Because this is a scoring criterion rather than a cap, an application with a higher fee percentage is not disqualified — it simply scores fewer of the available 7 points. Note the acquisition/rehabilitation table uses two separate fee measures (fee on the acquisition price and fee on rehabilitation cost) with narrower bands than new construction.
Neither QAP describes any rule for deferring developer fee — no stated maximum deferral amount, no required repayment timeline out of cash flow, no interest limitation on a deferred fee note. Many mainland agencies specify at least one of those; GHURA's silence here should be treated as an open item to negotiate with the investor and lender rather than a settled rule to rely on.
The island-wide "high-cost area" basis boost: GHURA's actual answer to Guam's construction costs
Buried in the 2025 QAP's final "Other" subsection, under the Extended Use Period discussion, is the one place the QAP directly addresses Guam's high construction costs: "High-Cost Area Designation. Newly constructed buildings located outside of designated Difficult to Develop Areas or Qualified Census Tracts qualify as a high-cost area. The additional LIHTC available from the 'basis boost' will be used to offset the high cost of construction and land throughout the island." That is a real, meaningful policy: rather than limiting the 130%-of-eligible-basis boost to whatever slice of Guam HUD happens to designate as a federal DDA or QCT, GHURA has effectively declared the entire island — everywhere outside those federal designations — to be its own high-cost area for new construction, making the boost broadly available.
The federal authority behind this is 26 U.S.C. §42(d)(5)(B)(v), which lets a state (or territory) housing credit agency designate any building as located in a difficult development area — and thus eligible for up to a 30% increase in eligible basis — if the agency determines the increase is necessary for the building to be financially feasible as part of a qualified low-income housing project. That authority applies only to buildings receiving credits under the agency's 9% state housing credit ceiling; it is not available to buildings financed with tax-exempt bonds. Given that GHURA's QAP has no described 4%/bond track at all (Phase 4), that federal limitation is not a practical constraint on Guam's 9% program today — but it does mean this basis boost would not travel with a project if a bond-financed structure were ever pursued instead.
Typhoon construction: a real building code, but nothing typhoon-specific in the QAP itself
Guam has adopted the International Building Code as its governing building code, administered through the Department of Public Works and a dedicated Guam Building Code Council created by P.L. 30-199 (Sept. 21, 2010). The codified statute itself, 21 GCA §67101, still reads "The International Building Code (IBC), 2009 edition ... is hereby adopted and enacted as the building code for Guam," but a 2016 legislative note attached to that same section states that P.L. 33-192 (Dec. 14, 2016) "amended/replaced/updated certain provisions of the 2009 Edition of the International Building Code ... with that of the 2015 Edition" — meaning the codified section number has not been re-numbered to say "2015," even though a later amendment moved key provisions to that edition. Guam separately adopted the 2017 Guam Tropical Energy Code (approved by the Guam Building Code Council on Feb. 25, 2020, enacted by P.L. 35-145 in 2021) as its energy-efficiency chapter.
A direct text search of 21 GCA Chapter 67 for "wind," "ASCE," and "1609" (the IBC's own wind-load section number) found no matches — the statute adopts the IBC by reference and does not restate a specific wind speed, exposure category, or risk-category table itself; those figures live inside the incorporated IBC/ASCE 7 standard rather than in Guam's own codified text. Separately, neither the 2024 nor the 2025 GHURA QAP contains any scored or mandatory typhoon-resistance, wind-load, or hurricane-strapping requirement distinct from ordinary building-code compliance — a direct search of both documents for "typhoon," "wind," and "hurricane" returned nothing beyond generic references to "local health, safety and building codes." For a territory this exposed to typhoons, that is a notable silence: GHURA's scoring gives points for general "Energy Efficiency and Sustainability Design" and "Universal Design and Accessibility" (Criteria 3) but nothing specifically tied to storm resistance.
One real, GHURA-sourced data point on what typhoon-grade construction actually costs in practice: a 2023 GHURA construction procurement document (an addendum to a solicitation for one of the agency's own capital projects, unrelated to a LIHTC deal) specified "International building code (IBC) 2018 edition, Wind Velocity 195 mph, Exposure 'C' as per ASCE 7," and separately required that "All Exterior windows shall be aluminum and windstand 195 mph wind velocity" and that exterior doors "windstand 195 mph wind velocity." That figure is useful context for what a Guam contractor is used to pricing, but it should not be mistaken for a QAP-mandated LIHTC design standard — it comes from GHURA's own non-LIHTC procurement practice, not from the Qualified Allocation Plan, and this research found no equivalent design standard written into either QAP.
Labor: no Davis-Bacon or prevailing wage in the QAP — but Guam's own law can still reach a project with government financing layered in
Neither the 2024 nor the 2025 GHURA QAP mentions Davis-Bacon, prevailing wages, or any labor-standards requirement for LIHTC construction — a direct text search for those terms in both documents returned nothing. That silence does not mean Guam has no local labor-standards law; it means the QAP does not address whether or when one applies to a LIHTC deal. Guam's own "little Davis-Bacon" statute, 5 GCA Chapter 55 ("Prevailing Wages in Public Contracts"), traces back to 1970 (Guam Code §10300, added by P.L. 10-143) and uses language closely modeled on the federal Davis-Bacon Act. By its own terms, it applies to "every contract to which the government of Guam is a party, for construction, alteration, or repair ... of public buildings or public works of the government of Guam" (§55101(a)) — a scope that, read alone, would not reach a privately owned, privately financed LIHTC apartment project.
But the statute has a second, broader trigger that a LIHTC deal can actually hit: §55108 directs the Director of Labor to make regulations for "contractors and subcontractors engaged in the construction, prosecution, completion, or repair of public buildings, public works, or buildings or works financed in whole or in part by loans or grants from the government of Guam." A LIHTC project financed purely with private tax-credit equity and a private conventional construction loan would not, on that language, trigger Guam's prevailing-wage law. But if GHURA or another Guam government agency layers in even a partial loan or grant — a common pattern on a deal this capital-constrained, given how small Guam's own credit pool is (Phase 4) — §55108's own text extends coverage to that construction. This is a real, statute-specific trigger that is easy to miss if a developer assumes (incorrectly) that Guam's prevailing-wage law only reaches contracts where the government of Guam is itself a party to the construction contract.
Federal Davis-Bacon applies independently of Guam's own statute, on the same terms it applies anywhere else in the United States: it is triggered by the presence of specific federal funding sources (HOME funds, CDBG in certain configurations, Section 8 substantial rehabilitation, RAD conversions, and similar programs), not by LIHTC allocation alone. A LIHTC deal with no federal funding source that independently triggers Davis-Bacon, and no Guam government loan or grant triggering §55108, would not be subject to either prevailing-wage regime on the record reviewed here — but given how often territory-based affordable deals layer in some form of public soft financing to close a gap, confirm the actual funding stack against both triggers before assuming market-rate labor costs in the pro forma.
Where this goes wrong
- Assuming GHURA imposes a Total Development Cost limit or a per-unit cost cap — a direct search of both the 2024 and 2025 QAPs found none.
- Assuming there is a contractor fee, general requirements, overhead, or profit cap — none is stated in either QAP; only the developer fee is addressed, and only as a scoring criterion, not a cap.
- Treating Criteria 15's developer-fee bands as a hard ceiling — an application above 18% of TDC (excluding fee and reserves) is not barred from applying; it simply scores zero on this criterion.
- Assuming a deferred developer fee has a stated repayment timeline or cap — neither QAP describes one; negotiate this directly with the investor and lender.
- Assuming the 130% basis boost in Guam is limited to federally designated Difficult Development Areas or Qualified Census Tracts — GHURA's own QAP designates everywhere else on the island as a "high-cost area" eligible for the same boost on new construction.
- Assuming that basis boost travels with a bond-financed (4%) structure — 26 U.S.C. §42(d)(5)(B)(v) limits the state-designated basis boost to buildings receiving credits under the agency's 9% ceiling; it does not apply to tax-exempt-bond-financed buildings.
- Assuming Guam's codified building code is current to a specific IBC edition just because §67101 says "2009 edition" — a 2016 legislative note describes provisions being updated to the 2015 IBC without the section's own text being re-numbered; confirm the operative edition with the Department of Public Works or Guam Building Code Council directly.
- Treating GHURA's own 195 mph / IBC 2018 wind-design specification (from a 2023 non-LIHTC procurement document) as a QAP-mandated LIHTC design standard — it is not; no equivalent standard appears in either QAP, which is silent on typhoon-specific construction requirements entirely.
- Assuming Guam has no local prevailing-wage law because it mirrors a mainland state's Davis-Bacon exposure — Guam's own 5 GCA Chapter 55 exists, and its §55108 trigger (construction "financed in whole or in part by loans or grants from the government of Guam") can reach a LIHTC project the moment any Guam government soft funding is layered in, independent of whether federal Davis-Bacon applies.
- Assuming federal Davis-Bacon applies to a Guam LIHTC deal solely because it received a 9% credit allocation — federal prevailing-wage coverage is triggered by specific federal funding sources, not by LIHTC allocation itself.
- HUD
- LIHTC
- State QAPs
- IRS § 42
- Housing Finance Agencies